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vSummary
Although hydropower does not directly consume
water, its generation frequently conflicts with
other uses, notably irrigation, because its release
schedule does not always correspond to the
timing of water use by other activities. In some
cases, water passing through the turbines is not
returned to the river but diverted to an adjacent
basin, which greatly alters natural regimes in the
river and potentially impacts on users located
downstream of the dam. This report analyzes a
case from southern Sri Lanka, where the
Samanalawewa dam and the Kaltota Irrigation
Scheme (KIS) compete for the water of the
Walawe river.
The KIS currently diverts approximately 80
million cubic meters per year (Mm3/yr.) through
two anicuts from an annual flow composed of
some constant seepage loss from the
Samanalawewa dam (around 55 Mm3/yr),
releases from the dam (40 Mm3), and occasional
runoff generated between the dam and the
diversion point. Dam releases correspond to
foregone hydropower benefits amounting to
approximately 8 percent of current production,
with a corresponding monetary value of Rs 210
million. The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB)
seeks to reduce its allocation to KIS in order to
maximize its production. With a water depth of
5,400 mm delivered over 850 hectares, mainly of
paddy fields, KIS is categorized as a project with
extremely low efficiency and is a likely candidate
to improving management and water saving.
This report investigates current water
management at three successive levels in order
to identify where losses occur and how these
can be remedied. At the catchment level, it is
shown that dam releases are well attuned to the
needs of KIS and to the occurrences of natural
runoff, and that little of the dam water is “lost” to
the river. At the scheme level, land preparation
uses large amounts of water, because of the
large capacity of the main canal, with a 3-day
rotation during the crop-growth period is loosely
adhered too, with ad-hoc on-demand
adjustments. At the plot level, it was observed
that a large portion of the project is endowed
with sandy soils, which incur very high infiltration
losses and which are rapidly left without any
standing water. This pushes farmers to access
water quite frequently during their turn, or during
the off-period.
Improving management has a cost, in terms
of both improvement of hydraulic structures and
managerial efforts from both the Irrigation
Department and the farmers. Stricter scheduling
requires increased collective action and more
individual discipline, and means less flexibility
and more work on the fields. For managers, it
means more attention to deficit areas,
monitoring and enforcement of the schedule
and measurements of volumetric flows, and
more frequent conflicts to be solved. Unilateral
curtailment of dam releases in the face of the
current high levels of diversion is not advisable
for a scheme with 2,000-year-old customary
rights and in a region of high political volatility.
Plot-level techniques that reduce water intake
such as System of Rice Intensification (SRI),
already introduced in the scheme, are unlikely
to reduce river diversions because of their
limited extent and the lack of any relation
between these diversions and actual crop
needs and practices.
Three options for achieving higher overall
benefit are proposed: the first relies on supply
augmentation or management improvements
mainly driven by the agency; the second is
based on incentives for farmers to change
cropping patterns and cropping techniques,
or to save water at the system level (with
management transferred to a Farmer Company);
and the third proposes a water-right based
system of reallocation. From a bottom allocation
of 40 Mm3, farmers could be collectively
vi
financially compensated for leasing part of their
entitlement, at a level equivalent to one fraction
of the benefit generated by the water redirected
to the power plant and to be negotiated.
In association with the option of management
transfer, this mechanism would ensure that
farmers use their expert knowledge of the
scheme to achieve improved management and
would strike a better balance between their
needs and those of hydropower, allowing for
adjustments when changes affect the agriculture
or energy sectors.
1Balancing Irrigation and Hydropower:
A Case Study from Southern Sri Lanka
François Molle, Priyantha Jayakody, Ranjith Ariyaratne and H.S. Somatilake
Introduction
Hydropower generation meets 19 percent of the
world’s needs and has been one of the main
driving forces behind the construction of the
45,000 large dams that can be found worldwide
(WCD 2000). The generation of electricity impacts
little on the quantity of water (it is limited to the
loss by evaporation in the dams) but it alters the
hydrograph of streamflows, as the timing of water
releases is governed by the demand curve for
electricity. This explains why conflicts between
hydropower and downstream uses, including
irrigation, instream uses and ecological systems,
often occur (Briscoe 1999).
A typical case of such conflict is found in
Central Asia, where the Kyrgyz Republic needs to
release water in the winter time to generate
electricity, while Uzbekistan and South
Kazakhstan need water in the summer for their
irrigation schemes (World Bank 2004). Another
classical conflict between dams and both
irrigation and ecosystems is found in the
Columbia river basin, in north-western US, where
salmon conservation has led to the
decommissioning of some dams, and where
agriculturalists occasionally cede their rights to
hydropower companies (NRC 2004).
In some particular cases, hydropower is
generated by diverting water into a contiguous
basin. In such instances, third party impacts on
downstream riparian users are potentially much
higher, although often mitigated by releasing a
minimum flow to the river. Upadhaya and
Shrestha (2002) discuss the case of the Kali
Gandaki “A” hydroelectric project in Nepal, which
diverts water from the Kali Gandaki and returns it
at a point 50 km further downstream, with
significant impact on fisheries. The Nam Theun-
Hinboun Hydroelectric dam in Laos has altered
regime flows in both the “giver” and “receiver”
basins, with impacts on fisheries, turbidity, bank
erosion, induced altered flood regime, fluctuating
water levels, loss of navigability and flood of
vegetable gardens (IRN 1999; Ryder 1999). The
diversion of part of the flow of the Alto-Tietê river
(Sao Paulo, Brazil) to the coastal zone through
the Billings reservoir in order to generate
electricity has severely affected the water quality
in the river, and diversions had to be limited to
flood time in 1992 (Braga 2000). Likewise, Helmi
and Ifdal (2003) report on the case of the Ombilin
river in Sumatra: this river originates from the
Singkarak lake but the outflow from the lake has
been regulated at 2–6 m3/s, against an earlier
average natural flow of 49 m3/s. The difference is
transferred by a tunnel through the mountain
range to the Ani river basin, on the western side
of the island, in order to generate hydropower.
This staggering diversion has left the Ombilin
river with a limited flow that has created problems
to the waterwheels of the traditional irrigators in
the valley. No impact assessment was done at
the beginning of the project in 1996/1997 and no
compensation was offered, but efforts have
recently been made to establish a dialogue
between stakeholders (Helmi and Ifdal 2003).
This report provides a case study from the
Walawe river basin, in southern Sri Lanka, where
a similar situation occurs. The Walawe river
2basin1 covers approximately 3,000 km2 and
extends from the ridge of the central highlands of
Sri Lanka, at an altitude of over 2,000 meters,
down to the southern coast (figure 1). The basin
offers a clear contrast between, on the one hand,
its highlands and its intermediate mountainous
association of ridges and valleys and, on the
other, the lowland plain itself. Precipitation varies
significantly in the basin from over 3,000 mm in
the northwestern tip to around 1,000 mm along
the seashore. The highlands are cut by many
valleys in which small streams, which are often
perennials, can be found. They feed the Walawe
river, which has an average discharge to the sea
of 1.1 billion m3/yr.
The Walawe basin was settled in the early
stages of the Aryan migration, starting around
500 years BC. It was part of the Ruhuna southern
kingdom and harbored several cities and
numerous tanks, some of which are still in use.
Irrigated agriculture developed early through the
construction of anicuts (small weirs diverting
small streams) (see Molle et al. 2003) and small
tanks (Brohier 1934; Mendis 1993). The Ruhuna
society flourished in the basin until approximately
the thirteenth century, when it started to decline.
During British times, most of the basin was
hardly inhabited and the population was
concentrated on the coastal and lower basin
areas, as well as on the mountain ridge. The first
plans to develop large-scale reservoirs and
irrigation facilities date from the 1940s, when a
set of seven dams were supposed to fully control
the different rivers and supply irrigation water to
the lower part of the basin (Batalm 1943).
However, initially only a central reservoir, the Uda
1The small Kachchigala and Karagan Oya basins, adjacent to the lower Walawe basin, have been hydrologically linked with the
Walawe basin through the Uda Walawe Project.
FIGURE 1.
The Walawe river basin.
3Walawe reservoir, was constructed in the mid-
1960s. Its capacity was sufficient to allow the
gradual development and irrigation of 15,000
hectares of land in the lower part of the basin, a
process which will be completed by 2005, after
the addition of 5,000 hectares in the so-called
left-bank extension area (Molle and Renwick
2005). A dam site for hydropower generation had
long been identified in the mountainous part of
the basin but only became a reality in 1992, with
the construction of the Samanalawewa dam in the
upper reach of the Walawe river.
Constraints specific to the local landscape
made it easier/safer to locate the power station in
the adjacent Katupath Oya basin and to supply
the turbines through a tunnel cutting through the
mountain (figure 2). By doing so, the flow of the
Walawe was diverted to another basin and water
users located downstream of the dam were
deprived of the abundant water they had enjoyed
hitherto. In effect, 10 km downstream of the dike
of the Samanalawewa dam two very old anicuts
can be found: these two anicuts divert water to
each side of the river and supply the 865
hectares of the KIS. Figure 2 shows that the
outflow of the power plant returns to the Walawe
river precisely at the downstream tip of the
Kaltota scheme: in other words, while this outflow
is made available to the Uda Walawe Irrigation
Scheme (UWIS), further downstream, it totally
bypasses KIS. This sets the scene for a potential
conflict between the Ceylon Electricity Board
(CEB) and KIS and illustrates the wider issues of
river basin management and water rights.
The second section of this report first briefly
describes the Samanalawewa reservoir and KIS
and their competition for water. The third section
then analyzes water management at several
nested levels, from the dam to the intake of KIS,
and further to the farmers’ fields. It seeks to
identify where the water coming from the dam
(leakage plus releases) flows to. The fourth
section looks at options for finding common
ground and trade-offs, and points to a few
solutions that can be implemented to maximize
the benefits from the Walawe water.
FIGURE 2.
Samanalawewa dam and power station.
4The Samanalawewa Reservoir and KIS:
Competition for Water
Puranagama. Old people in the Kaltota area
report that they earned a lot of money from chena
cultivation and this explains why paddy lands
were only cultivated in the yala (dry season from
April to September) season. The extent of paddy
was more than enough to produce food for this
limited population in a single season; water
management in the maha (wet season from
October to March) season may also have been
made difficult by the high flow in the river and
since chena cultivation provided handsome
returns there was no incentive to grow more rice
in an area with such difficult access to water.
With the colonization and the resulting influx of
people, chena lands were not accessible to all. In
addition, the rehabilitation of the scheme was
intended to grow two crops per year. Each farmer
on the left bank (LB), where the settlement first
began, was provided with 1.2 hectares of lowland
and 0.4 hectare of upland. Later, each settler on
the RB received 0.8 hectare of lowland and 0.4
hectare of highland. Most of these lands are now
fragmented into smaller plots. An additional 50-
hectare area of land is cultivated with drainage
water from the scheme and has now been included
under the project. Before the construction of the
Samanalawewa dam, the flow in the Walawe river
was abundant and farmers used to enjoy
unrestricted access to water, except during a few
rare dry spells when the flow would drop.
As land in the Kaltota area is limited very
few people now come to the area. The second
generation of settlers have been provided land
in the Uda Walawe scheme. The plots tend to
be divided among children and migration is
quite significant. Although Kaltota has a
Technical College, the lack of jobs in an area
that remains isolated for lack of good roads is
driving the youth away in search of job
opportunities elsewhere.
KIS
The KIS is situated in the Ratnapura district and is
fed by two anicuts that divert the flows of the
Walawe river at the very point where it abandons
its rough course across the mountain to enter the
main plain. That the site is propitious for
establishing irrigation facilities is well demonstrated
by the very early construction of the first anicut,
sometime in the first century BC. The area was
lost to jungle and malaria probably around the
sixteenth century, but the anicut diverting water to
the right bank (RB) was renovated in the late
1890s by the British, who tried to revitalize the
area, to no avail. The two anicuts were
reconstructed in 1956 by the Irrigation Department
(ID), as part of a plan including rehabilitation of the
area and settlement of the population from
neighboring districts. The design command area of
the project was about 760 hectares but the actual
irrigated area is 865.5 hectares, with a total
number of 1,501 settler families.
Although Puranagama, the ancient village at
the foot of the mountain, is very old, most of its
remaining villagers left the area in the 1930–1960
period because of the high incidence of malaria.
They settled in nearby villages such as
Molamure, Mulgama and Tenna and would come
to Kaltota early in the morning to return home in
the afternoon after finishing their work. With
malaria control in the early 1950s, people
gradually resettled in their ancient village. Most of
the farmers in the Puranagama area are tenants,
as these lands belong to old rich people (e.g., the
lands of the Mahawalatenna walawwa2).
Before 1960, chena (slash-and-burn)
cultivation was very popular among the Kaltota
farmers. Chenas were cultivated during the rainy
season in Welipothayaya, Medabedda,
Pahathbima, Diyavinna and other places near
2Usually a large house of a high-caste or distinguished person, so named to distinguish it from other houses.
5The layout of the KIS is quite simple (figure 3).
The 12.7-km RB main canal follows the foot of
the Kaltota escarpment and delivers water to a
strip of land located along the RB of the river.
There are 39 direct offtakes to lateral canals, 26
in the upper part (Puranagama) and 13 in the
lower part (Welipothayaya).3 There are also three
gates to control the water level in the main
canal. The LB main canal follows the central
and higher part of the tract of land located
between the Walawe and Weli Oya rivers. It
serves approximately 300 hectares.
FIGURE 3.
Layout of the Kaltota Irrigation Scheme.
area are controlled by farmers. Cleaning of the
field canal is done by farmers.
At the beginning of each season, a meeting
is held in Kaltota to decide the dates for starting
water releases and the quantities of water to be
released to the KIS during the next season.
These meetings are attended by representatives
of the Divisional Secretary, the Irrigation Engineer
in Ratnapura, Officers of the Department of
Agriculture, an engineer from the Samanalawewa
power station and members of each farmer
organization (FO).
The Samanalawewa Reservoir and
Power-Generation Capabilities
The Samanalawewa dam in the Uda Walawe
basin has been built mainly for power generation
and flood control purposes and has a capacity of
278 Mm3. As explained earlier, the flow to the
hydropower station is directed towards the
adjacent basin. However, a valve located in the
Samanalawewa dam allows water to be released
to the natural course of the Walawe river. After
construction, an unexpected water leakage,
emerging about 250 m downstream of the dam,
appeared in the right abutment due to some weak
subsurface soil formation. The permanent leak of
2.2–2.7 m3/s was later reduced (after wet-
blanketing) to below 2 m3/s (varying with the
water level in the dam: see appendixes 3 and 4).
Thus approximately 55 Mm3 are made available
without any control along the year. The dam is
operated at full capacity only since the repairs of
the leakage in 1997. Water for power generation
is sent through a 5.5-km-long tunnel that cuts
across the interbasin range to the 120 MW Power
Station of Kapugala (see figure 2). The station
has two generators with an annual average
energy generation of 300 GWh, which is
approximately equal to the energy demand of the
Sabaragamuwa province (300,000 households).
 
The KIS is under the responsibility of the
ID. Management is ensured by a Technical
Assistant (TA) assisted by two members of
field staff.  Main canal maintenance is also
under the purview of the ID but is contracted
out to farmer organizations (FOs). All the main
gates located along the main canals are
operated by the ID according to a rotation
schedule. All other gates within the command
3In Puranagama, these lateral canals are called CPO while in Welipothayaya they are named FC (field canal) and DC (distributary
canal), depending on the size of the area served. In what follows, all canals branching from the main canals are called lateral canals
for the sake of simplicity.
6Water management in Sri Lanka is
coordinated at weekly meetings held at the Water
Management Secretariat in Colombo. The meeting
is attended by representatives from the CEB, the
Director and Deputy Director of the Water
Management Secretariat, officials from the
Mahaweli head works, and representatives from
the Water Board and the ID. Decisions of
allocation for the whole country are based on a
thorough review of the entire water resource
situation in Sri Lanka both for agriculture and
power generation (Somatilake 2002). This
coordination is made necessary by the
importance of hydropower in the production of
energy in the country (around 50% of the total
generated) and by the “sharing” of the reservoirs
with the irrigation sector. After each meeting, the
Samanalawewa Power Station is informed, via the
System Control Center of the CEB, about the
amount of water releases authorized for both
irrigation and electricity generation for the
next week.
In times of normal supply, Kaltota receives
the bulk amount decided at the preseason
meeting. However, CEB may reduce its release in
a particular week if it rains. Such reductions
commonly occur three or four times by season
(see next section), and information on when to
reduce supply is provided by the Technical
Assistant of the ID stationed at Kaltota. On the
other hand, this assistant may also request
additional water in times of shortage. The request
has to be first radioed to the Samanalawewa
Power Station. Then, the Shift Engineer at the
Samanalawewa Power Station informs the system
control center in Colombo about the request.4
Based on his decision, the discharge from the
dam can be adjusted (Somatilake 2002). The
CEB never stops generating energy since it has
never found itself in a situation where water
stocks in the dams were not sufficient or getting
close to the dead volume. Turbines are switched
on and off at the request from Colombo, without
predefined schedules.
Outline of the Conflict
After the construction of the Samanalawewa dam,
the catchment area of the Walawe river flow
entering Kaltota was reduced from 410 km2 to 56
km2 (Bellaubi 2004), which resulted in a dramatic
change in supply and made it necessary to plan
releases from the reservoir in order to ensure
cultivation. Prior to the construction of the dam,
the water rights of the 2000-year-old downstream
area of Kaltota were implicitly acknowledged by
the CEB during the feasibility study and the dam
releases required were estimated at 46.36 Mm3/yr.
(CEB undated).
However, because of the unexpected leak in
the abutment that siphons out of the dam a
yearly average volume of 55 Mm3, the flow in
Walawe river is composite and includes this leak,
a 40-Mm3 “allotment”5 released through the sluice,
as well as the runoff generated by the small
catchment between the dam and the scheme.
Data relative to four successive seasons (more
on this later) point to a yearly diversion by KIS of
around 88 Mm3. At face value, this volume of 88
Mm3 would seem to amount to around twice the
volume that would be theoretically necessary to
irrigate the nominal command area of 865
hectares. This suggests that KIS should be able
to reduce its use, allowing for a reduction of its
allocation and thus benefiting energy generation.
That KIS now depends partly on the CEB for
its water supply creates some constraints on
cropping calendars and timing of supply. Farmers
have to follow the cropping calendar defined by
the planning of releases from Samanalawewa. For
example, the land preparation period is now
reduced to 15–20 days, against more than 30
days in the past. This reduction of the land
preparation period affects farmers located in the
tail-end area of the system and those who have
no plowing equipment and depend on others to
prepare their land. Farmers complain that hasty
completion of land preparation within a short
period of time affects the productivity of their
4The formal decision, however, is taken by CEB headquarters in Colombo. It does not appear that it is helpful to have such decisions
taken in Colombo, since their relevance is purely local (in fact, authorization is never denied).
5The average in the last 4 years is 38 Mm3. The average since 1994 is 40 Mm3 but two seasons had very low values because of repairs.
7fields. They also state that the yield of their
paddy has dropped from 4.5 t/ha to about 3.2 t/ha
after the curtailment of water but this is not
confirmed by the Agriculture Instructor (AI) of the
area. It is also argued that a reduced supply to
KIS has made it necessary to establish rotational
distribution in lieu of the earlier free and constant
flow to all areas but that applying such
systematic internal water distribution schedules is
difficult with the present irrigation offtakes of
varied sizes, the lack of proper control structures,
the damaged status of many structures and
silted canals.
However, there is little doubt that KIS can be
successfully irrigated with less water. The CEB
has tried to help solve the problems and develop
options to reduce water use. It has provided
tractors to expedite land preparation but such an
action was not successful in the absence of FOs
to manage them. The tractors were said to have
been used by some office bearers of the FOs but
not collectively managed. The CEB has also
called for a change in cropping patterns, with the
adoption of shorter cycle crops, and for the
adoption of water-saving techniques (see
next section).
The CEB would ideally see farming in Kaltota
relying solely on the leakage and natural runoff, in
order to reallocate the amount of water saved for
power generation. For two seasons, in 1997 and
1998, the CEB experimented with not releasing
water to the scheme and compensating farmers
through the Assistant Government Agent (AGA).6
Some farmers cultivated their lands with the
water from the leak but the inequity resulting from
this generated complaints and the experiment
was discontinued.
The issue can be framed in terms of water
rights. CEB officials at Samanalawewa have
hitherto adhered to a strict reading of their
obligation of releasing water from the dam but
they are now considering arguing with the Water
Management Secretariat that the leakage does
amount to a release from the dam and that only
the shortfall of the agreed amount should be
released through the sluice. Should this fail to be
considered, KIS’s existing water right could be
partly leased to CEB, or other types of
arrangements devised in order to compensate
farmers while maximizing benefits from
energy generation.
Financial Analysis
The value of water in both rice and power
production can be assessed in order to estimate
the benefit foregone by CEB (Somatilake 2002),
as well as to determine lower and upper bounds
of the price of water in a possible transaction: the
value to farmers gives the lowest bound of what
they would accept for relinquishing the use of
their right (for a season), while the value to CEB
would provide a maximum value for what it would
be ready to pay.
Total land extent cultivated = 865.5 hectares
in Kaltota
Total number of families = 1,501 as per
official records
Total yield (two seasons) = 8,310 tons
Average selling price per = Rs 15
kg of paddy in 2003
Average production costs = Rs 22,000
per ha/season (Hussain et al.
2002)7
The gross value of total = Rs 124,650,000
yield (GV)
The net value of total = Rs 86,568,000
yield (NV)
The benefit of this production is attributable
to (effective) rainfall, runoff, leakage and dam
release water, and it is difficult to assess their
relative values. However, one may consider that
rain-fed water rice cultivation would be impossible
because of too much uncertainty in supply. If the
6The total compensation was Rs 1.5 million.
7Excluding family labor.
8actual yearly supply (88 Mm3) is considered, then
the net value of water is 1.0 Rs/m3 (NV/88). We
must, however, distinguish between the sources
of water that make up this volume of 88 Mm3. As
will be shown later, the bulk of dam releases (i.e.,
around 40 Mm3/yr.) is diverted. The remaining 48
Mm3 come from the leakage and natural runoff. A
crude analysis also shows that the value of the
leakage is zero during more than one month out
of the 160 days of a given cropping season.8
Therefore, out of the 55 Mm3 coming from the
leak each year, only 38 Mm3 (55*2*120/360) really
contribute to irrigation. The remaining 10 Mm3
come from the runoff (or from the leak, but at a
time when the runoff would suffice to cover KIS’s
needs). In other words, KIS receives and uses
approximately 78 Mm3 of “effective” dam water
(releases + leak), while 17 Mm3 of water from the
leak are unproductive.
If a right of 46 Mm3 is considered (or rather,
the current release of 40 Mm3) and the whole
product ascribed to it, then an upper limit of the
value of water is 2.16 Rs/m3 (NV/40). It is difficult
to estimate the marginal value of the non-leakage
water supply. Since KIS has been receiving a
maximum amount of 40 Mm3 out of its 46 Mm3
allotment, we can infer that the marginal value of
water beyond 40 Mm3 is zero. The marginal value
to the farmers of the next “slice” of, say, 10 Mm3,
varies with rainfal but is also very dependent on
the cost of managing the scheme with less water.
This volume of 40 Mm3 of released water is not
only valuable as an input to crop production but
also as a substitute for capital and labor: tighter
management requires more care and workload (for
farmers and managers), investments in hydraulic
infrastructures, and herbicide (when water cannot
be used as a means of controlling weeds).
Managing the scheme with, say, 20 Mm3 is
arguably possible but with significant additional
costs not directly amenable to estimation. For the
sake of comparison with hydropower, a value of 2
Rs/m3 will be tentatively taken as an order of
magnitude of the total value (reflecting the costs
described above).
One should also mention that rice production
has backward and forward linkages that multiply its
benefits. People involved in input supply, transport,
milling, processing or retailing also get derived
benefits from agricultural production. In addition,
Kaltota is a remote area with little alternative job
opportunities. In such a context, the overall
multiplier effect of investments often ranges
between 1.5 and 3.0 (see Bhattarai et al. 2003).
It is not easy to estimate the value of a KWh
generated. One way to value this energy is to
consider the price paid by the CEB for one KWh
when bought from independent producers, that is,
Rs 7/unit. For a volume of water of 40 Mm3, the
average forgone benefit is 30 GWh, which gives a
total of Rs 210 million, that is approximately
US$2,100,000. This is equivalent to an increase
of 8 percent in production, while fixed costs and
recurrent expenditures remain roughly unchanged.
In comparison, this volume of water sent to KIS
contributes (together with other sources of water)
to generating a net added value of Rs 87 million.
The total release = 40 Mm3
(for irrigation)
The value of the = Rs 210,000,000
hydropower foregone
(30 GWh at Rs7/unit)
The value of one m3 of = 5.25 Rs/m3
water for hydropower
The average value of water for hydropower
generation is therefore between 2 to 3 times the
net value to farmers and a negotiated lease of
KIS’s water rights would therefore yield a price for
water somewhere between 1 and 5.25 Rs/m3. In
all cases, it is important to realize that we are not
faced here with an “either-or” dilemma but, rather,
with the possibility of increasing power generation
by up to 8 percent, while maintaining agricultural
production thanks to improved management. A
transaction at the margin would thus only have to
reflect the costs incurred by an improvement in
management (higher system efficiency for KIS).
Supply cannot be reduced without identifying
precisely at what level in the system managers
8The duration of a cultivation season is 160 days because the two main canal schedules are staggered by 3 or 4 weeks.
9should intervene and for what reasons so large
amounts of water seem to be lost, returning to
the drainage system. The cost of improving
management depends on where and how water
could be saved, and the implications in terms of
incentives and of who would bear these costs
have to be investigated. We now turn to
these issues.
Analysis of Current Water Management
Releases from the Dam and Natural
Runoff
There is little doubt that farmers in KIS enjoyed
an abundant supply of water before the
construction of the Samanalawewa dam. Figure 4
plots the average natural runoff estimated at the
Kaltota anicut as well as monthly values with
probabilities of 0.1 and 0.259 and compares these
flows with the actual diversion discharges
recorded at the anicuts (LB and RB). It is
apparent that even the one-in-ten dry-year
diversion needs can be fully met.
With the construction of the dam, the
catchment has been reduced from 410 km2 to 56
km2, that is, to 16 percent of the initial area. In
addition, the remaining part of the catchment
receives an average rainfall of 2,500 mm, against
an average of 3,185 mm for the whole
Samanalawewa catchment (Molle et al.
forthcoming). Assuming a runoff coefficient of
0.28,10 the actual runoff of the intermediate basin
9This is based on a series of flows for the 1960–2000 period reconstituted by Bellaubi (2004).
10The balance of the small catchment between the dam and the anicut during the November 2002–August 2003 period (for which
diversion flows and spill are available) gives a rainfall of 63 Mm3 (average of Kaltota [60 Mm3] and Samanalawewa [66 Mm3]
stations), a volume diverted to KIS of 75 Mm3, a spill (at the second anicut) of 10 Mm3, and a flow coming from the dam (leak+release)
of 67 Mm3. This points to a runoff coefficient of only 0.28, very close to the value (0.29) of the runoff coefficient of the Uda Walawe
catchment (–minus Samanalawewa catchment), which confirms the consistency of the flow data.
FIGURE 4.
Monthly flows at the Kaltota anicut before the construction of the dam.
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of 56 km2 can be estimated at a fraction of the
Samanalawewa catchment flow. We can then
compare the total river flow (average leakage and
natural runoff) with current levels of water
diversion at KIS anicuts. These two flows
combined cannot ensure the actual needs of 6
months out of 10 of cultivation, which points to
the necessity of releasing additional water from
the dam, if current levels of diversion are to be
maintained (figure 5).
By subtracting irrigation needs (taken as the
actual diversion), from the inflow expressed as a
sum of the leakage and the estimated natural
runoff (in average terms, and for probabilities of
occurrence of 0.25 and 0.10, i.e., one in 4 and
10 years, respectively), one obtains the shortfall
that has to be made up for with releases from
the dam (figure 6). It can be seen that, on
average, 2 months need additional supplies in
each maha, and 4 months in each yala season.
When dry years are considered, this requirement
increases, but not as much as expected
because of the stable and continuous
contribution of the leakage. For the one-in-ten
dry year, for example, an additional discharge
must be ensured during the 4 months of the yala
season and be as high as 1.5 m3/s in May-July.
The volume corresponding to the average
shortfall for the whole year is 24 Mm3 (computed
for the months with positive shortfall only).
FIGURE 5.
Estimated average flow at KIS without dam releases compared with needs.
FIGURE 6.
Shortfall in irrigation needs to be met by dam releases.
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Volumes Diverted at Kaltota Anicuts
Water can possibly be saved at two levels. First,
it is possible that diversion to KIS be reduced
and that dam releases be adjusted accordingly.
Second, it is also possible that a significant part
of actual dam releases does not actually flow to
KIS but is “lost”11 to the river. To estimate how
much water is diverted and how much is passed
on to the Walawe river, a monitoring of the spill at
the lowest anicut (LB diversion) was carried out
between December 2002 and September 2003,
with two daily observations (morning and
evening). The estimation of the spill was
complicated by the profile of the weir and the
removal of the logs in several parts of the weir
but the results obtained are nevertheless quite
satisfactory (see appendix 1 for more details). In
addition, inflows into the RB and LB main canals
were monitored by the ID between October 2001
and August 2003. All these data allow us to
better understand the final destination of the
water released by the dam, both by leakage and
by opening the sluice.
Figure 7 shows that, in most instances, the
water level in the river was under the level of the
weir; in some cases, however, logs were taken
out and the spill level in some of the spillways
was lower than the weir reference level. The
resulting spill in March and April was commonly
between 1 and 3 m3/s, and sometimes higher.
Natural runoff added to the flow coming from the
dam; releases from the dam, if any, could thus
be reduced.
FIGURE 7.
Water level and spill at the second anicut.
11“Lost” with regard to CEB objectives: this flow might be important or essential to the sustainability of river ecosystems.
Spillover logs
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Figure 8 provides an answer to this question
and shows how the Walawe river flow was divided
at Kaltota during the end of the 2002–2003 maha
season and the 2003 yala season. After abundant
rainfall in November, dam releases were
discontinued during most of December. They were
resumed in early January, interrupted again after
3 days (January 7–9) of sustained rainfall, and
increased gradually until the end of the season.
Significant runoff was generated during
the off-season interval and lost to the river. On
the opening of the LB canal on March 20, this
runoff and the leak provided a total flow of around
4 m3/s and there was no need for additional dam
water. It was only by May 7, one month later,
after natural runoff subsided, that it was
necessary to gradually increase the supply, up to
around 2 m3/s. The absence of spill at the lower
anicut from June to the end of the season shows
that management has been sound and “waste”
avoided. One might question here whether
avoiding spill is an acceptable strategy given that
the interruption of flows might have an impact on
the ecosystems downstream. This impact is
probably minimal because both tributaries and
return flows from the fields find their way to the
river again a few hundred meters downstream.
The inflow to RB and LB canals observed by
the ID during four seasons provides additional
information.12 Figure 9 shows the total inflow to the
two canals during four seasons and compares it
with the total flow coming from the dam (both the
leak and the leak plus the releases [TotRelease]
are indicated in figure 9). It can be seen that maha
2001/2002 and maha 2002/2003 seasons were
able to start only when the dam released water; in
contrast, canal diversion in yala 2002 and yala
2003 started before water was released from the
12Inflow observations have been made at intervals varying between 1 and 7 days. Therefore, the data do not properly describe daily
fluctuations in water level and discharges. Nevertheless, they provide a smoothed quantification of inflow into KIS.
FIGURE 8.
Water balance of the water flow at Kaltota, yala 2003.
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dam. This indicates abundant runoff and shows
that CEB has waited for the natural flow to decline
before releasing water from the dam. Several
slumps in dam releases during both maha seasons
indicate that CEB has also adequately attuned
dam releases to the needs and discontinued them
when natural rainfall generated sufficient runoff to
meet KIS requirements. Maha 2002/2003, for
example, shows several periods when releases
have been interrupted or reduced, allowing a
considerable reduction in the dam contribution of
almost half of the average value. The conclusion
that can be drawn from this analysis is that little of
the water released by CEB is “lost” to the river.
Natural runoff is made use of and management is
quite responsive to fluctuations in the magnitude of
this flow.
Water Management within the KIS
Since the management of dam releases does not
seem to incur significant losses at the second
anicut, we must now turn our attention to KIS
itself. No quantitative flow data are collected by
the field staff of KIS, which makes any analysis
or water balance problematic. Therefore, a
qualitative assessment of water management in
the RB command area was undertaken.13 In
addition, two FC canals (FC1 and CPO11) were
FIGURE 9.
Water diverted at Kaltota and total dam releases.
13One student from the Sabaragamuwa University was involved in observing water management practices at the main and lateral
canal levels.
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selected for a more detailed analysis of plot-to-
plot water management.
Rotational schedule
The rotation schedule in KIS has two 3-day turns.
During the first turn of 3 days, water is provided
to CPO1 to CPO11 as well as to D3, D4 and
Pahathbima (figure 10). The second 3-day turn
supplies CPO12 to CPO25, and D1 and D2.
However, this theoretical management rule is not
strictly enforced. More water is provided to canals
which have water problems. Long lateral canals
(like D2)14 and sandy soil areas tend to receive
continuous flow. Personal relationships between
farmers and members of field staff are important
in obtaining ad hoc adjustments of supply in case
of need.
FIGURE 10.
Division of the command areas for the definition of
rotational schedule.
Water management problems at the system level
Several problems related to water management
are mentioned repeatedly by users:
• Proper control of water is not possible
because many gates have been broken.
Members of the ID field staff try to close
offtakes with straw, weeds and debris but
these materials are often subsequently
removed by farmers.
• The main canal has five lateral security
spillways. At the intersection of the canal
with the Gonakandura ara (river), there is a
large structure that allows the flow of the river
to be incorporated into the RB main canal,
and also to spill to the Walawe river, if need
be. The wall of this structure is broken and a
significant leak can be observed.
• Some farmers do not follow the schedule
agreed during the kanna (seasonal) meeting. A
particular problem is that of land preparation.
Farmers without means of plowing or
cultivating large tracts of land (3-5 hectares)
can never complete their work on time.
• Most of the farmers want to keep water
standing in their paddy fields as in the past,
especially when their soil is sandy. Due to
this reason, farmers often reopen the gates
after they have been closed by the ID.
• Some farmers live far away from their fields
or have other activities. They are hardly
aware of the rotation schedule or are unable
to come on the day when rotation
commences. Therefore, they try to access
water illegally when they come to their field
“out of turn.”
14D2 canal is the longest lateral canal and provides water to around 100 hectares. It is divided into two parts and receives continuous
flow with an internal rotation: 4 days for the canals FC13 to FC21 (60 ha) and 3 days for FC22 to FC24 (37 ha).
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• In longer canals, tail-end parts are given extra
hours of supply at the farmers’ request but
farmers located on the way also divert this
source of water.
• Wastage is apparent in some field channels.
Some paddy fields have more water than
required while others do not get enough water
(see next section).
• Head-end/tail-end disparities are also
observed at the main canal level:
Welipothayaya (tail-end) farmers believed that
they received/used less water than the
Puranagama (head-end) farmers, which is
confirmed by the ID staff. It is not clear
whether this reflects differences in soil type
or just uneven distribution.
All these problems are quite commonplace.
Nevertheless, the general impression is that
supply is rather abundant and that occasional
mismatches between demand and supply can be
dealt with by contacting the ID staff who will in
general arrange some additional supply.
Water Management at the lateral canal level
There are eight FOs on the RB canal of Kaltota,
three in the Puranagama area and five in
Welipothayaya/Pahathbima. The Pahathbima FO
is independent of the ID because it is not
officially part of KIS and only uses excess water
in the RB main canal (if any). Most residents
settled there only recently and do not have legal
rights to their lands. The Katupath Oya water
diversion scheme now provides water to this
area, using tailrace water from the power station.
FOs convey the decisions taken at the kanna
meeting, organize canal cleaning and appoint one
or several of their members as “Water
Controllers.” Overall, these FOs are rather
inactive and are undermined by the fact that
some farmers do not respect rotations and solve
their problems directly through personal
relationships, rather than through the mediation of
the FOs. The FOs have keys to open offtakes to
field channels within the area. These keys are
kept by the Water Controller or the Chairman of
the FO. The FOs have no role in the operation of
the main canal.
In larger lateral canals, farmers practice
rotations within the canal. The Water Controller of
the FO manages the rotation. Some provide 2
days for the upper part and one day for the lower
part, others 1.5 days for each, depending on the
layout of the lateral canal area.
However, most villagers said farmers in the
upper parts get more than enough water while
others get very low quantities. Head-end farmers
block the canals and take water even in the
period when it is allocated to tail-enders.
Plot-to-plot water management
As in most parts of Sri Lanka, farmers’
allotments are composed of several liyaddas
(sections of paddy fields demarcated with bunds)
distributed along a topo-sequence. Water is
delivered to the highest field and then passed on
to the adjacent lower plots through notches made
in the bunds. At the lowest point water generally
spills into a drain. This plot-to-plot system is
quite complex and the behavior of a given set of
interconnected plots depends on numerous
factors, including soil type and permeability,
topography, layout, subsoil characteristics, pattern
of water inflow, and quality of the field bunds. In
Sri Lanka, topo-sequences are often quite short
and over a few hundred meters or less there is a
succession from sandy soils (red brownish earth
[RBE] soils) in upper parts down to clay soils
(low-humic gley [LHG] soils) in the lower parts.
To understand whether and how the 3-days
on/3-days off rotation in KIS gives way to water
waste, one needs to observe the behavior of a
few particular sets of plots during and between
rotations. Plots which quickly dry up will need
more frequent watering but the return flow, both
surface and subsurface, may also be reused by
other plots. Two lateral canals were selected
(Welipothayaya FC1 and Puranagama CPO11) for
close observation. During two 3-day rotations,
water levels in different plots were measured
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twice a day. Pegs were installed close to the
outlets where water flows to the next plot
because this is generally the area which dries up
last. A total of 31 pegs forming three lines were
installed in successive plots as indicated in figure
11 (plots with pegs are colored).  The three sets
of plots along the topo-sequence are pegs 1-11,
12-22, and 23-31.
The following figures show the evolution of
the water level in the plots during two successive
3-day “off” periods, after supply to the lateral
canal was interrupted. Figure 12 indicates that
plots P1, P2, P7, P8 quickly dry up. These plots
are very sloppy and show a lot of superficial
cracks. P1 and P2, the top plots, are particularly
sandy. It can also be seen that the initial water
levels in the plots are quite low. The sill levels of
the bund notches are kept rather low in order to
speed up the filling up of the whole sequence but
farmers fail to raise them by the end of the turn.
Figure 13 shows a similar pattern with
topmost sandy plots drying up very rapidly. Plots
21 and 22 are close to the drain which is rather
deep at this point. The drawdown of the water
table probably explains the rapid drop in water
level in the lower portion of the topo-sequence. In
the third line (figure 14) the drop is even more
significant. Although several plots start with a
water depth of 10 cm or more, they have no more
standing water after 3 days. The lower part is
also sandy and dries rapidly. All these data are
summarized in figure 15 which confirms that the
extremities of the topo-sequence tend to dry
rapidly.15
FIGURE 11.
Sample plots selected and equipped with pegs (FC1).
15In addition, since pegs were placed in the lower part of the plots; parts of uneven fields were sometimes already dry although there
still was standing water near the peg. It must be noted that the pattern of seepage (losses through holes, cracks, or subsurface flows
from one plot to the other) is quite complex. Holes are sometimes difficult to detect and farmers constantly repair the bunds, as new
infiltrations appear. It is almost impossible to document the evolution of such losses, although they, of course, also impact on the
evolution of the water status of the plots.
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FIGURE 12.
Evolution of water depth in the fields (peg nos. 1 to 11).
FIGURE 13.
Evolution of water depth in the fields (peg nos. 12 to 22).
FIGURE 14.
Evolution of water depth in the fields (peg nos. 23 to 31).
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A similar experiment was conducted in the
command area of CPO11 (3 ha, 4 farmers; see
appendix 2). Many plots also showed a loss of 10
cm within a day or two. However, the gate was
broken and debris used to close it, but farmers
opened it again due to water shortage after more
than one day. Even with such additional supply
two of the three lines exhibited plots with water
levels close or equal to zero at the end of the
rotation (see figures in appendix 2). It showed
that the majority of plots do not retain water
during the 3 days “off.” Many plots are therefore
under a “wet and dry” irrigation regime. This is not
necessarily a problem if no water stress is
imposed on the plant, although weeds (and rat)
problems tend to increase when water disappears.
Farmers consider it important to have frequent
access to water to minimize the duration of the
period with no standing water in the plots. This
explains why farmers with sandy plots are not
content with filling them up at the beginning of
the rotation but try to get water at the end of it
(or after completion of their turn), in order to
better endure the next off-period. It also shows
that it would not be advisable to design rotations
with more than 3 days “off.” Similar observations
made by IWMI (unpublished results) in the Uda
Walawe Irrigation System and other parts of the
country confirm that plots with RBE soils
generally dry up between two rotations and that
the behavior of a series of plots along a topo-
sequence varies according to factors such as
slope, soil infiltration rate, and depth of the drain
with relation to the last plot.16
FIGURE 15.
Number of days water is retained in the fields (two successive rotations).
16In some cases, when the slope is limited and the drain shallow, lower plots tend to accumulate water and are always well irrigated. In
situations where the slope is steeper and the drain deeply excised, lower plots tend to dry up very quickly because of the drawdown
of the water table.
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Seeking Common Ground
The above evidence shows that a substantial
amount of water is in effect diverted to KIS, while
little of the water released by CEB is “lost” to the
river itself. The discussion must therefore center
on what kind of incentives and practical solutions
can be designed in order to elicit in KIS a type of
water management that can rely on reduced
diverted quantities of water. This section first
reviews the different alternatives for reducing
diversions and then looks at how they can be
implemented or made effective, distinguishing
between three categories namely, bureaucratic (or
centralized), incentive-based and right-based.
Can Water Diversion to KIS be
Reduced?
Present water application and possible
improvement in scheduling
Before estimating what could be a reasonable
reduction of supply to KIS, it is important to
compare agronomic crop requirements and actual
gross diversion volumes and to understand the
reasons for the gap between these two values.
Table 1 provides an estimate of requirements of
the rice crop for each season. Table 2 calculates
plot-level requirements by adding water for land
preparation (LP) (in soils with fine and loamy
texture, taken here as 350 or 800 mm) and
replenishment of daily losses by percolation and
seepage. Observations (see section under Plot-to-
plot water management, p.15), have shown that it
is extremely difficult to assess these losses at
the plot level. Primarily there is a high variability
in percolation depending on soil type: some plots
may lose 10 cm in one day or two, while others
may have losses of 1 mm/day. In some
instances, part of this percolating water
reemerges in lower plots of the topo-sequence but
we do not have information on the magnitude of
these flows. In addition, seepage to adjacent
plots is often not a loss because the plot-to-plot
system ensures recycling through capture of
seepage by lower plots.
If we tabulate the value of total plot water
requirements according to average S&P loss, we
can see that this value varies widely (table 2).
However, there is a limit beyond which this
conventional method of estimating irrigation
requirements becomes meaningless. The method
considers that irrigation supply must make up for
the S&P loss because it is assumed that
maintaining standing water is a target objective.
In sandy soils17 with a few centimeters of S&P
losses per day, this is only possible with
continuous supply but it is problematic with a
rotation schedule, especially if “off” periods are
long. In practice, it is observed that such plots
are already under a “wet and dry” irrigation
regime. Consequently, the conventional method of
estimating crop irrigation requirements is of
limited interest, as it leads to gigantic values.
What prevails is practical experience that
determines whether a duration of 3 days (or any
other duration) is sufficient to irrigate the full area
under a given lateral canal, and if an interval of 3
days off does not incur yield loss. If it is not the
case, then these canals are attributed more time.
Table 2 provides estimates for two values of
LP: 350 and 800 mm. The first value is a
common (high) estimate of LP in paddy soils,
while the latter corresponds to the observed flow
in KIS (~ 4 m3/s) for a duration of 20 days and a
total area of 850 hectares. This is a very high
value that is partly explicable by the nature of the
soil and the lack of mechanical means in the
area to expedite the operation. It is also due to
the high discharge capacity of the main canal,
with regard to the area served: over 4 m3/s for
850 hectares, which allows a flow close to 5 l/s/
ha. This can be compared with the design
discharge of the Right Bank Main Canal in UWIS,
17Under lateral FC22, 5 hectares of paddy land have been abandoned due to the highly sandy nature of the soil. Affected farmers
were given lands in other places but these abandoned lands are still cultivated using canal water.
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TABLE 1.
Rice (agronomic) water requirements by season (mm).
Paddy agronomic
requirements
Month Penman ETo Days Kc Paddy Total
(mm/day) (mm)
 May 5.33 20      1 107
 June 5.66 30 1.15 195
 July 6.57 30 1.2 237
 August 6.66 25 0.9 150
Total 689
 December 3.96 20      1  79
 January 4.38 30 1.15 151
 February 5.34 30 1.2 192
 March 5.34 25 0.9 120
Total 542
TABLE 2.
Plot water requirements, for different values of S&P losses and land preparation requirements.
Percolation (mm/day) 1 3 5 10 15 20 25
LP=350 mm
Maha 1,143 1,353 1,563 2,088 2,613 3,138 3,663
Yala   998 1,208 1,418 1,943 2,468 2,993 3,518
Total 2,141 2,561 2,981 4,031 5,081 6,131 7,181
LP=800 mm
Maha 1,593 1,803 2,013 2,538 3,063 3,588 4,113
Yala 1,448 1,658 1,868 2,393 2,918 3,443 3,968
Total 3,041 3,461 3,881 4,931 5,981 7,031 8,081
which serves 10,000 hectares with a maximum
discharge of 25 m3/s: this gives us a module of
2.5 l/s/ha (in line with a design peak water
requirement of 2.25 l/s), i.e., half that of KIS.
The impact of this on dam water use,
however, must be downplayed since data for the
two yala seasons studied earlier showed that LP
was mostly achieved with natural runoff and the
leak flow. The maha seasons showed otherwise
but it is likely that LP in maha seasons also use
dam water frequently. We lack exact data on the
start of the cropping season dates to confirm this
hypothesis but the late starting dates of dam
releases (CEB daily data) combined with cropping
calendars that are ahead of those in Uda Walawe
suggest that most seasons do indeed start without
contribution from dam releases. This is also
confirmed by the average duration of dam-release
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periods for the last nine cropping seasons, 124
days,18 which is more than one month shorter than
the overall diversion duration at the anicut.
Early season start, at least when natural
runoff is available, and staggering of the cropping
calendars of the two sides (RB and LB) are two
effective ways to maximize the use of the
leakage and to reduce dam releases. These two
possibilities seem to be fairly well exploited under
present conditions. An automatic recording and
transmission of flows at the second anicut could
inform dam managers in real time about the
status of the flow in the river and allow a fine-
tuning of dam releases but the benefits would not
be that high under present circumstances, since
attention is already directed to this issue.
The gross diversions to the two main canals
amount to around 5,400 mm of water applied to
the fields, with the exception of maha 2002/2003,
which enjoyed abundant rainfall, judging from the
four seasons for which we have records (table 3).
This value is close to that observed in the Uda
Walawe scheme, which has diversions between
2,000 and 3,000 mm/season, depending on the
season (since the rehabilitation in 1992). If we
consider tentatively that conveyance losses make
up 25 percent of the inflow, then the water depth
applied at the plot level is around 4,000 mm
which, according to table 2 is the water required
for a percolation loss of approximately 6 mm/day.
The average actual S&P rate is probably much
higher than this, which explains why many plots
are left with no standing water at the end of the
“off” period. As mentioned earlier, this does not
necessarily impact on crop growth but it probably
increases the need for weed control and imposes
the necessity for frequent rotations (water coming
back every 3 days).
The rates of water diversion are certainly high
but it is important to understand that, in isolation,
high rates of diversion are not a problem per se.
Indeed they are, rather, a rational way to ease
management by ensuring a continuous flow into
farmers’ plots half of the time. Because of the
location of KIS along the river itself, any excess
water quickly makes its way to the drain, either
directly or through subsurface flows. The amount
of water depleted in KIS is largely a given
parameter (the evapotranspiration of rice fields
and surrounding vegetation) and all amounts
beyond this value will go back to the Walawe
river and are made available to downstream
users. The particular reason such practice is not
optimal in the present case is that CEB would
increase its benefits by diverting part of this
water through its turbines, while returning it, but
only at the downstream part of KIS.
As discussed earlier, water management can
be improved but at a cost, both financial and
managerial. Therefore, it is not enough to reckon
that per-hectare water diversion levels are high;
one needs to understand how these could be
18This does not consider occasional days in the middle of the cropping season when releases are discontinued.
TABLE 3.
Amounts of water diverted to KIS during four seasons (Mm3).
Maha Yala Maha Yala Gross area Net area
Season 2001/2 2002 2002/3 2003 (ha) (ha)
LB 13.8 14.6 10.9 14.3 440 300
RB 30.8 33.1 25.9 32.1 700 540
Total 44.6 47.7 36.8 46.4    1,140 840
Total (mm) 5,259 5,612 4,381 5,459
Dam releases 19.9 20.2 11.1 14.6
Leak 20.6 23.7 22.8 26.2
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reduced, what the implications for users would be,
and how incentives to change could be designed.
Diversion to KIS can be reduced only if the
allocation to at least a significant number of
lateral canals can also be reduced: in practice
this means that the actual 3-day “on” turn should
be reduced to 2.5 or 2 days whenever possible.
(Increasing the duration of the “off” periods is the
second option but it is likely to compound the
situation of sandy soil plots and is therefore not
considered viable). There are, however, several
constraints to such reductions:
• First, if farmers within a lateral canal have to
irrigate their plots within a shorter period they
will have less flexibility in choosing the time
to go to their fields and they will have to
expedite the different operations needed to
irrigate all of their plots; they will also have to
achieve greater coordination among fellow
farmers along the same lateral so that
everyone can be served during a shorter
time. Less time means more managerial
constraints and more burden.
• Second, fine-tuning the number of days of
“on” of each lateral will make the existing
rules more complex by having laterals with
different durations of “on” and “off” periods;
this would create additional work for field
staff, and confusion among farmers.
• Third, if reductions are to be sizable, they will
necessarily place a constraint on farmers, thus
eliciting more “deviant” behaviors and
increasing the need for monitoring and
enforcement: it is unlikely that the existing ID
staff members are in a position where they
can impose a strict scheduling and control
farmers. On the contrary, more tampering with
and destruction of structures can be expected.
Improving Cultivation Techniques: SRI
Water diversions could also be reduced if
cropping techniques, or the crops themselves,
were changed. The System of Rice
Intensification, or SRI, is a cultivation technique
that may lead to significant reduction in water
diversion for paddy irrigation. It was introduced in
Sri Lanka in the late 1990s and was identified by
CEB officials as a potential means to reduce
water use in Kaltota.
Briefly, the technique includes transplanting of
young seedlings (8–15 days) at low density (25
cm x 25 cm or more), organic fertilization,
mechanical weed control, and water management
that alternates wetting and drying rather than
permanently flooded conditions. Experiments in
Sri Lanka (Namara et al. 2003) have shown that
average increases in yield of 40 percent are
achieved when shifting from conventional rice
farming to SRI, but that labor requirements are
around three times those of the conventional
method. SRI is therefore attractive to farmers
who have a large family labor force. Water control
is also paramount and reduced water diversions
must be paralleled with predictable supply.
It is important to note that the quantity of
water depleted by evapotranspiration is globally
unchanged, since the alternate wet-and-dry
irrigation technique is not deficit irrigation and is
careful in not generating water stress: only the
flow diverted to the plot can be reduced, as
flooded conditions are not required. The decision
to admit water into the plot, however, belongs to
the farmer and is independent of what other
farmers do; it also does not affect other users (or
only positively, by increasing water available to
them) or the water that is supplied to the lateral
canal. Therefore, even if a significant number of
farmers within a lateral canal command area
adopt SRI, this will only result in increasing return
flow to the drain (especially by spill to the river at
the tail end of the canal), not in water savings. It
is only if all farmers were to adopt SRI, an
unlikely event, that this could be translated into a
change of schedule for the lateral canal. In
compensation, this inflow would have to be made
more predictable because the implications of an
interruption of irrigation are magnified in a SRI
system, where soil moisture is often close to the
limit under which stress may occur. Water
savings can only be effective if factored in water
management at the scheme level.
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Changes in Cropping Patterns
The preceding sections have abundantly shown
that a large part of the soils in KIS are not paddy-
soils and that growing rice incurs high losses by
percolation. It is, therefore, easy to come up with
the recommendation that farmers should shift to
other field crops. The issue of diversification is
beyond the scope of this report but it is worth
mentioning that the adoption of cash crops is
constrained by market risk, lack of skill and
capital, and above all by transportation: Kaltota is
still a very remote area, with a narrow and winding
access road that hinders commercial activities.
Increasing Supply to the Left Bank
Another possible option to decrease the
contribution of the Walawe river to KIS is to
supply the LB with the adjacent Weli Oya river
(see figure 2), which would necessitate some
head works and a canal to link this river with the
LB canal. The Weli Oya river is being diverted
several kilometers before it reaches the Kaltota
area through a weir. This new project is designed
to take Weli Oya’s water to an area of
approximately 1,600 hectares that includes a few
existing tanks. The diversion canal has a
capacity of 4 m3/s. Figure 16 shows the monthly
discharges in the Weli Oya at its junction with the
Walawe river, as estimated by Bellaubi (2004). It
is apparent that with a diversion set at 4 m3/s,
the discharge of 1.2 m3/s needed for the LB can
only be ensured 2 months each season (April-
May and November-December) for the dry year
with a probability of occurrence of 0.25.
Depending on the environmental flow required
probability of supply will be reduced accordingly.
There is, therefore, scope for a partial supply of
the LB through the Weli Oya but the cost of the
diversion needs to be assessed to confirm
whether this is a viable option or not.
Available options for improved
management
The options reviewed above cannot be
implemented without concerted efforts or
adequate incentives to stakeholders. Three
situations can be distinguished.
Bureaucratic options
Enforcing stricter scheduling. Improving scheme
management as outlined earlier can be achieved
by the ID. The focus must be on fine-tuning the
amount of water distributed to each lateral,
interrupting flows when all plots are served. It is
likely that several laterals can be served within
two, or two and a half days instead of three, at
the cost, again, of tighter management. At the
FIGURE 16.
Monthly flow in the Weli Oya river (values for various probabilities).
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main canal level, rotations must also be stricter,
lateral spill avoided, and water flows at key points
monitored. This implies a drastic increase in
monitoring and enforcement capacity,
rehabilitation of broken offtakes and other
structures, and strict mechanisms to impose
sanctions on deviant behaviors. This option is,
under present conditions, not considered realistic
because of the lack of staff and adequate
structures to enforce strict scheduling and
volumetric monitoring of supply to different parts
of the system.
Diversion of Weli Oya. An increase in supply to
the LB is possible (with a full coverage of needs
in an average year but only partial in dry years),
as shown earlier. Compared with possible win-
win arrangements, this option requires
substantial capital investments and is not the
best one.
Reducing supply. While it would be tempting, in
the face of very high water duties enjoyed by
KIS, to unilaterally curtail dam releases, this
option would, in all likelihood, backfire. It would
antagonize farmers and generate turmoil in a
region of high political sensitivity and volatility.
The issue would be couched in terms of poor
farmers versus hydropower, and of spoliation of
ancient customary water rights, and would
undoubtedly stir much unrest.
Incentive-based options
The second option is to opt for incentive-based
policies that encourage farmers to implement
some of the measures conducive to reduced
diversions.
Support to diversification. Options such as crop
diversification to less water-intensive crops or the
introduction of SRI are unlikely to spread on a
large scale unless they are encouraged by strong
incentives. Extension services for improved
cropping techniques and patterns, coupled with
secured markets (e.g., contract farming), might
convince farmers to move away from rice.
However, it must be noted that the resulting
decrease in water demand must be translated in
a change in scheduling (shorter “on” periods for
the D canals concerned), and these changes
consolidated at the canal level in order to be
transformed in reduced diversions. If the plots
with such cropping patterns or techniques are
scattered it will be very difficult to fine-tune
deliveries and schedules in order to take these
changes into consideration. In sum, such
measures have limited potential unless they
occur on a large scale, just like banana
cultivation in UWIS has now spread over 45
percent of the area, with some D canals having
their paddy areas reduced to 5–10 percent of their
command area.
Bonuses. Another incentive-based option would
be to reward farmers for whatever water saving
they would make under a threshold of 40 Mm3
(taken as the actual average use).19 For example,
farmers could receive, say, Rs 2 for each m3 of
water deducted from the existing level of 40 Mm3.
This would be a win-win situation whereby CEB
would increase its benefit from electricity
generation while farmers would be compensated
for the improvements in management they would
need to do to accommodate the reduced supply.
This subsidy scheme could be agreed for a given
number of years (e.g., 10 or 15 years) and then
phased out,20 with a new cap (upper limit)
established at a lower level (say 15 Mm3) after
adjustments have been incorporated in new
management procedures.
19Such policies are uncommon in water management but have been envisaged in Spain (see Sumpsi 1998): in contrast with other
pricing policies, they do not incur substantial income losses before becoming effective.
20The level of the subsidy could be calculated as a percentage of the sale price of the KWh, to avoid problems with inflation.
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This poses the thorny problem of how this
subsidy could be channeled to farmers while
escaping capture by some more powerful
stakeholders. It can be imagined, for example,
that a KIS Farmer Company could receive the
money and use it for a maintenance fund or for
reselling fertilizer at a much reduced price.21
Indeed, distribution of bonuses as well as
adjustment of water management rules are hardly
possible without transferring the management of
the scheme to farmers. This, of course, does not
ensure that they will be able to successfully
“internalize” these tasks, but leave to the users
the responsibility to share both benefits and the
(relative) water “scarcity” to be created. Such a
transfer of O&M cannot be achieved overnight
and would also require the rehabilitation of
structures and offtakes, and support to train and
organize FOs and a Farmer Company.
In all cases, it is important that—even if
reduced—the inflow into the main canals be
predictable. Fortunately, the leak ensures a regular
flow of around 2.2 m3/s; the KIS will therefore be
assured of a minimum supply that will protect it
from more critical vagaries. If a stricter set of
management rules is to be designed, it will
become important to have quantitative monitoring
of flows at a few points, which will require
modernization/repair of some structures.
The CEB is “willing to spend Rs 2–3 million a
year” for 5–10 years to ensure that no water is
released from the irrigation sluice. The CEB sees
this project as a pilot project which, if successful,
could be extended to Kotmale, where a similar
situation exists. Saving 20 Mm3 “bought” back
from farmers at 2 Rs/m3 would mean not only a
cost of Rs 40 million but also a benefit of 15 GWh
priced at Rs 7/unit, that is, over Rs 100 million.
Right-based options
All the preceding options are likely to be
undermined by the status of KIS as a 2000-year-
old water user. Instead of the trouble with
designing and administering a system of
bonuses, it might be preferable to fully recognize
the water right of KIS and negotiate a seasonal
compensation for any “borrowing” of a share of it.
This would allow flexibility with regard to future
expansion of the command area, adjustments in
cropping patterns (that might be governed by
external factors), or in the relative price of energy
generation. According to the above analysis, the
transaction would probably fetch a price between
2 and 5 Rs/m3 but this price would be
renegotiated whenever needed.
This shows the potential interest of a right-
based approach, as a basis for water resource
management at the basin level. Water rights do
have the advantage to provide water users with
some kind of compensation when they agree to
have some of the water they use reallocated to
other users. However, there is no such system of
formal rights at present in Sri Lanka. The state
has legal ownership of all surface water and does
not recognize any system of individual or
collective water ownership rights (Meinzen-Dick
and Bakker 2001). In practice, water abstraction
is often chaotic and unregulated (Samad 2005)
and allocation is chiefly an issue within irrigation
schemes and within the Mahaweli system, where
it is left to the discretion of the line agencies
concerned. A recent attempt to introduce a
system of administered water rights has been
faced with much public opposition (MONLAR
2004) and eventually failed (Garduño 2001;
Samad 2005).
21Or the subsidy from CEB could be granted directly in kind (fertilizer, mills for the Company, etc.)
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Beyond political dimensions, the difficulties
to arrive at both institutional and technical
performing arrangements probably also explain
why right-based transactions and management of
water were not established and are so infrequent
in practice (see Molle 2004). Establishing a full
registry of users, with a quantitative assessment
of the water they both withdraw from and return
to the system is not an easy task in a country
with thousands of small tanks and anicuts.
Monitoring of use, law enforcement, and judicial
capacity may also be lacking. Just like in the
preceding case of the bonus system, a strong
Farmer Organization is necessary (but not
sufficient) to take the collective decision to
lease part of the water entitlement, and to take
care of the redefinition of water management as
well as of the distribution of financial
compensations. Much transparency as well as a
sound control of water flows are needed but
these may currently be beyond the reach of the
Farmer Organization.
Arrangement based on water rights (or
entitlements) must preferably be enshrined in a
legal framework that gives due recognition to
such rights, as well as in a mode of basin
management that is effectively based on bulk
allocation and monitoring of quantities of water
used. However, even in countries where rights are
not fully established, or in which irrigation is
supposed to give priority to urban use in case of
shortage, such arrangements are observed in
times of shortage. In China, the city of Tsingdao
bought out nearby irrigation dams, instead of
using costly water diverted from the Yellow river
(Molle and Berkoff 2005). In Spain, the city of
Seville inked agreements with both irrigation
districts and the hydropower company to secure
supply during the last drought (del Moral 1998).
A right-based approach will have to decide
whether the leakage is part of the right or not
(assuming that it is there to stay and can only
increase in the future). If the “effective” 38 Mm3
coming from the leakage and diverted each year
are computed then only 8 Mm3 will remain to be
obtained from the dam, if the original 46 Mm3
are taken as KIS’s entitlement. Given current
levels of diversions, this would be impracticable
and would probably lead to the questioning of
the validity of the 46 Mm3 "entitlement." On the
other hand, not considering the leakage would
probably endow KIS’s farmers with a right that is
substantially above standards, even considering
the high permeability of its soils. It is likely that
a renegotiation of the allotment would have to
take place and CEB’s officials are now
considering shifting from an early position where
the leak was disregarded to one where it would
be considered as part of the supply coming from
the dam.
Conclusions
This study has investigated a classical case of
conflict between power generation and irrigation,
whereby reductions in diversion to irrigated areas
would allow an increase in power generation. It
was shown that CEB had consistently complied
with its (informal) commitment to provide KIS a
historical water right of 46 Mm3, despite an
unexpected 55 Mm3 flowing to the river each year
by seepage from the dam abutment. Management
of dam releases was shown to be efficient in that
little of the dam water released for irrigation was
not diverted to KIS.
By any standard, the quantity of water per
hectare diverted to KIS is high. However, this
quantity has to be viewed keeping in mind that
most of the land is subject to high losses by
seepage and percolation, that current infrastructure
and staffing do not allow stricter management, and
that continuous flow is a rational labor-minimizing
strategy when water is abundant.
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The CEB faces the challenge to instill a
change in water use behavior that would allow a
reduction in dam release and a corresponding
increment in the power generated. It would be a
mistake to deduce from the rather high per
hectare rates of diversion that water savings can
be easily obtained. Achieving a quantum leap in
management efficiency will place a significant
additional burden on both farmers and managers.
Neither an outright decrease of supply nor a
support to water-saving cultivation methods like
SRI is likely to help achieve this objective.
Some carefully designed incentive system,
coupled with a process of turnover of
management to a Farmer Company,
accompanied by due rehabilitation of critical
structures, has the potential to achieve a trade-
off that would satisfy both parties. Innovative
incentives such as “compensations” proportional
to the quantities of water saved could be
negotiated. Such subsidies could be channeled
through the Farmer Company and feed a
maintenance fund and/or be used to buy and
resell subsidized input for cultivation to farmers.
Alternatively, a right-based approach whereby
KIS would lease some of its entitlement against
a negotiated compensation, in accordance with
changing conditions in the agriculture and energy
markets, could be considered.
The implementation of such reforms,
however, has several prerequisites. The most
important is the political will by the ID to turn
over transfer to farmers. It is also recommended
to establish a thorough diagnosis of water
management in KIS in order to better identify
structural and nonstructural constraints before
embarking in partial modernization of the scheme
and in institutional reform. The substantial
benefits that can potentially accrue to both sides
are sufficient to warrant further consideration of
the way to improve management while sharing
the benefits generated.
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Appendix 1.
Measuring spill at the second anicut
The second anicut diverts water to the LB canal. The anicut has four gates made up of seven wooden
logs with a 1.57 m length, 0.14 m height and 0.06 m width. When the gates are fully closed, with all
these logs in place, there remains an 8-cm gap between the crest of the anicut and the topmost log.
The water level was measured twice a day. Morning readings were taken around 7 a.m. and evening
readings around 5 p.m.
Flow Calculation
Two types of flows were distinguished:
1. Spillover the cement crest of the anicut
2. Spillover the gates (either when fully closed or when a few logs were removed)
30
Spillover the anicut crest
The weir formula is used:
Q (l/s) =Cd*W*H^1.5 where, Cd=1.6, W=width of the anicut (65 m), H=spill height (cm)          (1).
Spillover the gates with all logs
Same formula as above with a width of 1.67 m for each gate.
Spillover the gates when a few logs are missing
Same formula as above with H changing according to the number of logs missing.
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Appendix 2.
Plot-to-plot observations
Layout of CPO11
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* Evolution of the water level in the plots of CPO11
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* Number of days with standing water (CPO11)
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Appendix 3.
Evolution of the leak discharge
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Appendix 4.
Historical evolution of the water level in Samanalawewa
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